The demarcation between science and pseudo-science has immense significance for science and philosophy. Yet, the demarcation is not just an issue for the scientist and philosopher. In a form of society that systematically appropriates science for the purposes of production to psephology, distinguishing science from theory-contrary –to-science is a theoretical and practical matter[1].

To call a theory a pseudo-science, is to say that the theory does not conform to a criterion of science. For many years in analytic philosophy, the criterion of science was that science is theory with an empirical basis[2]. Hence, science and pseudo-science are incompatible features of a theory with respect to their empirical basis, while the history of science is progress from pseudo-science to science and the reductive and cumulative continuum of factual knowledge. Challenges mounted against the received positivist account of science have brought into question the presupposed criterion of science, and so also the demarcation. Could it be upheld that science must have a stronger empirical basis than a pseudo-science? If the demarcation is not necessarily a function of the strength of the empirical basis between theories, then on what grounds can we critique a theory as pseudo-scientific[3]? In this paper, I hope to try to formulate an answer to the demarcation-problem in analyzing the distinction between science and ideology, and then apply the result to critique a theoretical presupposition of economics as pseudo-scientific.

I argue that a theory can be both ideological and scientific. However, there exists a continuum between the terms in which the clear case of an ideological theory is whether the theory interprets a social state of affairs to be natural and universal, and a clear case of scientific theory is internally consistent, externally explanatory and can concur in producing certain effects, two inseparable aspects of the objectivity of theory. Then, a theory is called scientific if it is objective and does not interpret social affairs in a natural and universal way, and ideological if is not objective and does interpret social affairs in a natural and universal manner. Pseudo-science is a non-scientific and ideological item of knowledge. A paradigmatic case of a pseudo-scientific concept, which plays a fundamental role in neo-classical economics, is the “representative agent” in the demand theory of neo-classical economics. I contend this fundamental concept has the implication of misconstruing historical tendencies to be necessary features of human behavior, playing a role that precludes understanding the features of historical mechanisms and the manner of affecting them.

In the section I, I give an explication of ideology. In section II, I show how ideology conflicts with science, and give an account of science in order to elucidate the distinction between science and pseudo-science. In section III, I use the account to discuss historical knowledge i.e. knowledge of the inherent inconstancy of social forms. I contend that historical theory that fails to understand the historical mechanisms and tendencies at play in the course of events will not be able to intervene in procuring certain outcomes, and hence will be non-objective. In section IV, I speak of the representative agent in economic theory, and argue that on the continuum it is pseudo-scientific because it is not objective and ideological.

 

I

 

The term “ideology” was first brought into philosophical currency by Destutt De Tracy, but popularized in the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels[4]. Within their work, the term “ideology” has various, often inconsistent, meanings, but I will focus on two central meanings. I will now analyze the distinction of intensions before briefly discussing their affinities and relationships and their relation to a broader process of social legitimation[5].

The overarching theoretical function of the term “ideology” is to give a historical materialist explanation for the existence and prevalence of a system of ideas in a given social context. By “historical materialist explanation” I mean that term A explains the existence and prevalence of social item I if A can show how item I contributes to the persistent tendencies of social system S. A persistent tendency is a disposition P that obtains for the social system S such that it is relatively immune from conditions external to the system, and is a partial and essential condition for the existence of the system[6]. Hence, ideology explains the existence and prevalence of a system of ideas if the term can show how the system of ideas is an essential condition and contribution to the persistent tendencies of the system.                            In most accounts of ideology the specific way in which the system of ideas contributes to the global tendencies of a social system is to legitimate the social relations and conditions [7].

To legitimate something is to consider it to be acceptable within some relevant normative regime. In order to understand the process of legitimation inhering in ideology, it is necessary to take into account a distinction of two intensions of the term. The criterion of the first kind of ideology is those systems of ideas that owe their existence and pervasion to the fact that they directly or indirectly promote current social conditions or sanction the current social relations. Those social conditions and relations systematically advantage certain groups over others, notably those who stand to gain most by preservation of those conditions and relations. I call this “functional ideology”. The criterion of the second kind of ideology is those systems of ideas that are unaware of the current social basis, and so are often supportive of false beliefs about society. I call this “ideological illusion”. The use of illusion might be misleading. The way it is used here does not exclude that a piece of full-fledged knowledge may be “ideological illusion” if it is unaware of and also promotes ignorance about its social basis[8].

Between these terms there are certain affinities and relationships. “Functional ideology” need not be “ideological illusion” and the converse as well.      A system of ideas may be aware of its social basis and still contribute to promoting social conditions and relations, just as a system of ideas may promote ignorance of its social basis and detract from the current conditions and relations. Yet, in the process of legitimation “ideological illusion” is coupled with “functional ideology” such that the unawareness is characterized by positive beliefs that misconstrue social conditions and relations. The misrepresentation predicates its social basis and conditions to be natural and universal, and in doing serves the interest of the ruling class.

By natural and universal I mean that the system of ideas attributes necessity to social relations and conditions. Yet, the form of “necessity” attributed to the social relations and conditions is not de re modal necessity such that if x is referred to by an ideology as being P, it is necessary that x is P. Such a form of necessity would be much too strict to satisfy, as it would be simple to produce a model and counter-example for any supposed necessary social condition or relation. Take the supposed necessary social condition of “family”, then the boy of Averyon would be enough to disconfirm the statement even for a model restricted to @. Instead the necessity attributed to the social relations and conditions takes the form of a future-temporalized conditional: for all societies x, given invariant social condition or relation Q at some initial time T_{0 ,} then any society x will eventually develop condition or relation P at some later time T_x such that x> 0 , and once condition or relation P has emerged at some time T_x then it cannot change. The ideological move par excellence is to try to argue, that given the kind of world we live in, and the sorts of beings we are, the social condition or relation is immutable and applicable to all societies independent of history. For instance, an ideological idea on money could be: for any human society, given that humans guarantee their biological life by producing the things they need, money will eventually emerge in the development of society to articulate production and exchange, and so simplify production. Also, once money becomes a social condition and relation of a society, it is immutable.

Hence, the ideological form of “necessity” attributed to the social condition and relation is broadly synonymous with “inevitable for any society”. It is the purported inevitability of a social condition or relation that serves as a ground for legitimacy. For, if a social condition and relation is taken as inevitable, then to consider the emergent condition or relation as illegitimate is to make a normative judgment about something for which there seems to be no alternative. It would be analogous to considering the laws of classical mechanics and the outcome of a physical motion to be illegitimate[9]. As ideology is often imputed to a system of ideas as a critique, the ideological defense par excellence is to claim that there is “no other way” to think as society cannot be “any other way”. Such fatalistic ideas on society are powerful in convincing people of the normalcy of, or the futility in attempting to change the social order.

We can now present a criterion for ideology. For the moment I will restrict the range of ideology to theory[10]. A theory T is called ideological for group G and F if: 1) directly or indirectly sanctions the social conditions and relations and so contributes to serving the interest of group G over F 2) misinterprets social conditions and relations between G and F to be necessary in a way in which they are not and 3) on the basis of 2) considers the social conditions and relations between G and F to be legitimate, or at a minimum, acceptable.

 

II

 

The net result of ideology is to legitimate social conditions and relations by misrepresenting them as necessary fiats of nature such that they seem legitimate. The legitimation process contributes to maintaining social conditions and relations. There is a general belief in the literature on ideology that science and ideology are incompatible and mutually exclusive features of a theory[11]. Yet, though there is some sense in denying that an ideological theory can be scientific, there is nothing in the descriptions I have given of “functional ideology” and “ideological illusion” to suggest that a scientific theory cannot be ideological in one or the other senses of the term. It is possible for the science or better the interpretation of science to be ideological. Now a possible argument to deny such a claim could be: if the term ideology is used to explain the existence and persistence of a theory, and rational grounds are sufficient for a scientific explanation, then the historical materialist explanation for the existence and pervasion of a theory cannot constitute a scientific explanation, and hence a scientific theory is not ideological. The argument, however, depends on an equivocation of “explanation”, and a confusion of the conditions of existence for P with the epistemic conditions for believing that P i.e. the explanation of science versus a scientific explanation[12]. Hence, a theory may in part exist and be widespread because it sanctions the status quo, and also be objective knowledge in that the theoretician has independent, and fully rational grounds for holding it to be true. A theory may also be unaware and ignorant of the social basis, and yet still also be objective knowledge with regard to say some aspect of the natural world[13].

The denial that science cannot be ideological is related to a certain antiquated vision of the objectivity of science. If the objectivity of science is constituted by inquiry that is 1) value-free 2) not biased by theoretical and/or factual presupposition and 3) which uses intersubjective and reproducible methods that are determinate and independent of the particularities of individuals [14], then there has never been science on earth. It is such a vision that is responsible for producing an incompatibility between all scientific and ideological beliefs. Yet, there is a tension between ideology and science, between the legitimation process and the objectivity of science. After all, if a theory couples functional ideology and ideological illusion to misinterpret social conditions and relations, then there is a possibility the theory will exhibit a bias to limit or exclude beliefs that detract from the “necessity” of social conditions and relations. Hence, such a theory will not systematically ground propositions according to a criterion of objectivity. It is the fact that a theory determines propositions as a function of the legitimation process in some significant way that makes it a pseudo-science. In the following, I give a revised realist account of the objectivity of science in order to show in what ways ideology may violate the criterion, and to better define the conditions under which a theory is considered pseudo-scientific.

Natural science is a process whereby the agents of science work on antecedent knowledge to produce objective knowledge of the causal mechanisms generating phenomenon. The objectivity of such knowledge should, prima facie , be interpreted to mean that the theory corresponds to something real. The objectivity of such a theory is to be judged on a theoretical criterion of internal consistency, and external explanitoriness, with a practical criterion of the manipulation of the causal mechanism to produce expected outcomes. There exists a feedback loop between theoretical and practical knowledge in science such that given theory T asserts method M can generate effect X in virtue of the fact that M activates causal-mechanism C_1,……C_n which according to T brings about X, and the generation of expected effect X is justified by the fact that theory T is objective and corresponds to something real. For example, in the process of experimentation the biologist observes that short-term malnourishment is antecedent to a series of events in which T-cells migrate to the marrow to become more adept at dealing with pathogens, and isolates the workings of this migration-mechanism. If the biologist can use the knowledge of the migration-mechanism (minus malnourishment) to produce a therapy that has the effect of strengthening the immune-system, then the justification of such success is the objectivity of the theory of that mechanism within the immune-system. There are two aspects of this preliminary account of the objectivity of theory that I want to turn to: 1) the abductive justification for affirming the objectivity of theory and 2) the concept of a causal mechanism.

The objectivity of theory is an inference to the best explanation (IBE or abduction) of the empirical success of the corollary methods determined by a theory, since to argue that it is either no or not the best explanation of such a success is to posit that it is a (continuous) “cosmic coincidence” that the theory and method correlated with the expected outcome. Such a defense of the objectivity of theory is known as the no-miracles argument (NMA), which employs the inference-rule of the IBE to derive the conclusion that the best explanation of the empirical success and instrumental reliability of a theory is the attribute of objectivity.

There is a major objection to the NMA that such a defense of the objectivity of theory by the no-miracles argument (NMA) itself depends on the reliability of IBE, and hence is a viciously circular argument. I would like to briefly suggest a strategy to refute the charge that such a defense is viciously circular and is no explanation of the empirical success of theory, leaving the question of alternative explanations to the side.

A circular argument is one that assumes the truth of what is trying to be proved i.e. the conclusion p’ is identical to or a mere rephrasing of the premise p’.          Yet, the fact that the premise is the same as the conclusion is not a sufficient condition to attribute a kind of invalidating circularity to the argument. In order for the circular argument to be invalid it must offer reasons for accepting a conclusion, in which the reasons include accepting the sentence itself as premise i.e. it is a “premise-circular” argument that offers an argument for p’ by accepting the truth of p’, and hence has minimal probative force. However, there is another form of circularity that is not necessarily invalidating. The circular argument begins with premise p’ and then by using inference rule I, it derives the conclusion q’. However, q’ has the logical predicate that it asserts or implies the use of R is reliable i.e. it is a “rule-circular” argument in which the argument is an instance of the inference-rule confirmed by the conclusion.

The NMA asserts the empirical success of some theory and its corollary method, then using IBE it is concluded that the theory is objective. The truth of the conclusion is part of a sufficient condition for accepting the IBE as reliable, so that the argument is not “premise-circular” because its conclusion is not in the premise. Yet this seems to suggest vicious circularity since in order to use the inference rule we must first presuppose the conclusion to be true, and in order to derive the conclusion to be true we must first presuppose the reliability of the inference-rule. Yet, it is not necessarily the case that the rule must first be proven reliable before it is used e.g. it is not necessary to prove the reliability of modus-ponens before it is used and considered reliable in argument and forms of thought in science should not be limited to some contemporary logic and understanding of deductive truth-preservation. An externalist conception of proof and non-deductivist understanding of scientific inference simply requires us to accept that the rule is reliable and that it not fulfill the requirements of deductive truth-preservation. For instance, modus-ponens is used because there is no reason to doubt that it is a reliable inference-rule, and it is not possible to give a proof of the reliability of modus-ponens which itself is not in a meta-language presupposing deductive, and truth-preserving inference-rules. Hence, it is just the truth of the premise together with the conclusion of a rule-circular argument entails the reliability of the rule.

The hardest term that I fear I will not be able to deal with fully here, since it requires a full-length treatment of explanation and causation, is the concept of a causal mechanism. The value of the term lies in the way it is counterpoised to the regularity account. Unlike the regularity account, such a term points to the resolution of the aporia of causal necessity. I use regularity account in a very general sense that applies to most post-Humean accounts of causation. The hard-core of the regularity account is that the range of the causal-relation is co-extensive with “perceivable events” and is a relation of spatio-temporal contiguity and succession between perceived events in which having repeatedly perceived event of kind A followed by events of kind B, allow one to make the inductive-inference from perceiving A to perceiving B. Causal- reasoning and talk of necessity is just inductive generalization couched in deductive terms, and science consists in the inductive generalization of phenomenal regularities[15] . The various D-N, INUS, counter-factual accounts of causation have retained the hard core of Hume’s notion of causal knowledge as inductive generalization, hence presupposing that the causal relation is an empirical connection- a connection between events in which we are passive spectators. From such a presupposition, it would be valid to claim no such “causal necessity” can be experienced first-hand. Yet, without such a presupposition it is possible to better approach questions of causation, and causal necessity[16].

I have in part already presupposed my account of causal mechanism in speaking of the persistent tendencies of a system in conjunction with historical materialist explanation. A persistent tendency of a system was considered a disposition such that it is relatively immune to conditions external to the system and makes an essential contribution to the survival of the system. Yet, such a definition is restricted to what could be called “teleological systems” in which the system realizes certain tendencies not simply as a matter of fact, but as a condition of it’s existence. An organism is such a “teleological system” in which the tendency to consume is an essential condition for it’s survival. A more general account of a causal mechanism is that it is a causal–relation between tendencies or dispositional features of a system of individuals, and a causal-relation is simply an active relation between tendencies or dispositions of individuals within a system.

A tendency or disposition puts an absolute limit on the possible interactions between individuals within a system, but are not necessary properties and relations which must be instantiated in each and every case. If a tendency or dispositional property P of x entails that it is not the case that x must be P, but entails that it is the case that x must be P in potentia [17], then a causal relation R between objects x which is P and y which is Q is not an empirical relation between perceivable events in which xRy is instantiated in each case in which x is P or y is Q. Rather it is an objective relation between the tendencies or dispositional properties of individuals and presupposes that the tendency or disposition be activated by a stimulus condition in such a closed system which minimizes the effect of interfering conditions.

There are two ways to better clarify the proposition that “the tendencies or dispositional property P of x necessarily exists in potential’. The first interpretation is simply given the identity-criterion I of x, to analyze the tendency or disposition P of x as a possibility-statement i.e. if x is I, only if it is possible for x to be P. Yet, to consider a dispositional property to be a possible feature of x, is simply to take it as contingent, or as having obtained in at least one case in the domain of the actual world. There is any number of non-tendential features or non-dispositional properties fulfilling the semantic-condition and such an interpretation must take tendencies or dispositions to be continuously active. To specify the interpretation: given the identity criterion I of x, to analyze the dispositional property P of x is to state x is I only if under set of suitable conditions C, x would manifests property P and without the set of suitable conditions it would not, and that there may be either an external system and its tendencies and dispositions or an internal tendency or disposition of the same system which account for it not being activated in some causal process to produce some phenomenal regularity.

The part of the statement that includes the subjunctive conditional is key.      A suitable condition for a tendency or disposition is a stimulus condition that in part accounts for the activation of a disposition. In parallel, there are latency conditions that could cancel out the stimulus and account for the non-activation of a disposition. For instance, if walking is taken to be a disposition of John, and we know he is disposed to walk when he is feeling morose, and does not walk when he is feeling happy, then the analysis of his disposition would take the form that if he were morose he would walk, and if he were not morose, he would not walk. The stimulus-condition(s) can be confirmed empirically in an experiment whose function it is to isolate and minimizes conditions that would cancel the stimulus or exclude the exercise of the tendency or disposition. In such a controlled environment, it would be possible to confirm the material implication form of the subjunctive-conditional.

It is necessary here to take into account that a theory of a causal mechanism is a closed-system. Yet, the world which science inquires into is an open-system in which a multitude of differing kinds of mechanisms operate in conjunction to produce phenomenon. Hence, a tendency or disposition of a system may exist and yet the mechanism responsible for a phenomenal regularity may be inhibited by a counter-veiling tendency or interfering condition, so that a real mechanism may be active, active unperceived, or inactive. A thought-experiment or experiment is a means of isolating a mechanism and assuring the minimization of counter-veiling or interfering conditions. Hence, the “necessity” of the causal-relation, the fact that the theory is objective and corresponds to something that endures and is relatively stable outside the experiment, is an abductive-inference from the empirical success of experimentation in isolating a closed-system and its tendencies and dispositions.

To revaluate the scheme of science that I gave above “… process whereby the agents of science .. produce objective knowledge of causal mechanisms” simply translates to : science discovers the tendencies and dispositional properties of individuals, and attempts to understand the possible causal relations between these dispositional properties, as well as the conditions of stimulus and latency for the mechanism. A theory of a causal mechanism focuses on a closed-system and the point of experiment, or thought-experiment, is to isolate that system such as to discover its tendencies and dispositions. Such an account of science allows us to understand the dual-criterion of objectivity with a greater degree of clarity.

Now that we have a better understanding of the objectivity of theory, a criterion of objectivity that does not a priori exclude science from being ideological, let us clarify the relation between science and pseudo-science. Science is the production of knowledge about causal mechanisms such that its value is determined both by theoretical considerations, and practical considerations of realizing certain outcomes. Hence, we can better substantiate the distinction between science and pseudo-science. The paradigmatic case of science would be theory that fulfills the dual-criterion, and which does not have the effect of distorting social relations in such a way as to legitimate them. Pseudo-science is theory that does not fulfill either one of aspects of the criterion, i.e. neither comprehends causal mechanisms nor their use, and which is ideological in the sense that it distorts social relations in such a way as to legitimate them. In fact, pseudo-science is unscientific because the influence of ideology on the formation of theory.

 

III

 

The dual-criterion of objectivity applies to both natural and historical knowledge[18]. It is often thought that historical knowledge is nothing more than the description of a continuum of events, and that a historical explanation is just to explain some given event in terms of past events. Yet, the historian does not simply describe a career of events, which anyways is a basic and general form of explanation applicable to history just as much as to evolutionary biology. Instead, much like a scientist is thought to, a historian also tries to understand the relevant mechanisms at play in history, and such knowledge is used to bring about certain outcomes[19]. Yet, there are significant differences between a natural and historical mechanism. If a causal mechanism for some given system is an active relation between the dispositional properties and relations of individuals, then a historical mechanism must presuppose some relevant class of systems with its specific dispositional properties. Yet, it is not immediately evident what that set is or the kind of disposition at hand. After all it is common to assume that history is something that is not distinct from nature in the actual world, so that it would be difficult to demarcate a class of “historical” from a class of “natural” systems, and just as confused to differentiate “historical” from “natural” mechanisms. The difficulty then is a general one of differentiating “human history” from “nature”.

Often times the specificity of the historical is marked off by suggesting that historical entities are simply material entities which have observer-dependent features, and hence exist as a function of consciousness even if the matter of their existence can exceed the attitude of any given individual. Yet, such an account of a history, though it admits of the possibility that historical features are an objective state of affairs in the sense of not-depending on any given individuals ideation,         is subjectivist to the core[20]. A commodity is a physical object that exchanges for money, but such an exchange-value does not exist ex nihlio. The value requires the existence of a system of production just as much as the ideation of agents, so that the claim that the historical object, or the historical aspect of the object, exists because of consciousness cannot be taken without qualification. I fear that “exists as a function of consciousness” is not sufficient to demarcate a historical system from a natural, nor a historical from a natural mechanism. Instead, it is better to understand that a historical mechanism is socially-relative.

I suggest that when we speak of a historical system, we are speaking not so much of a continuum of events, or mind-dependent objects and features, but of the development of human society, a complex development which presupposes social just as much as natural conditions (physical, chemical, biological, geographical, economic, ideological etc.). Let us claim that the specific contribution which history makes is not simply to identify the combination and interaction of heterogeneous mechanisms accounting for an event or a course of events, but above all to account for the event or course in terms of socially-relative historical mechanisms. The temporal difference between a natural and social mechanism is that a natural mechanism exists in potential or is an active causal-relation for all societies at each and every moment in @, unless it can be assumed that at some point in the past the nomological statements of physics differed. The mechanism of a historical system is a active relation between tendencies or dispositional properties for a specific kind of society, and hence is relative to the duration of the social form. The mechanisms that obtain of a historical system at one moment may no longer apply at another moment, so that in this way historical knowledge resembles biology, which also takes as its object the development of systems, in which discontinuities in the series between kinds of being change the relevant mechanisms under study. In short, different kinds of societies presuppose different historical mechanisms, so that a historical mechanisms changes as a function of the social form. It is the transience of a historical mechanism and social form that is the differentia specifica of human history versus nature.

It is the fact of the differing social organization between social forms that imposes distinct dispositional properties and persistent tendencies to the system.            Take “feudalism” versus “capitalism”, feudalism is based on a mode of production in which the immediate producer i.e. the serf – partially owns the means of production, and the liege appropriates a part of the product of labor in the form of a tithe. As a function of such an organization of the labor-process, the system will exhibit certain distinct global tendencies and dispositions as opposed to capitalism. For instance in feudalism the immediate producer will remain a quasi-independent producer, and the social form will not exhibit technological dynamism. In capitalism, the immediate producer will become an employee and the disposition to maximize profit in the accumulation of capital will account for the technological dynamism of the social form[21]. Of course we can ask if there are transhistorical mechanisms and disposition. Yet, even though such a thing is possible, I contend it only serves an epistemic purpose of comparing social forms. If a transhistorical mechanism is identified then the only conclusion that can be made is that we have an explanation for all kinds of societies, but if the work of history is to inquire into the development of specific social forms, then such an explanation is not applicable in explaining say feudalism versus capitalism, much less the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In fact, the abuse of universal generalizations in place of historical tendencies is a central aspect of ideological history, an issue that I will speak of later in section IV[22].

Historical knowledge would then be the knowledge of the distinction and interaction between heterogeneous kinds of historical mechanisms where emphasis is put on accounting for the development of a human society by the identification and analysis of transient mechanisms unique and relative to the social form.

 

IV

 

We are now prepared to discuss the distinction between science and ideology, science and pseudo-science, as applied to concept of the “representative agent” in the theory of demand in neo-classical economics. I will assume that neo-classical economics is a historical science despite all appearances to the contrary[23].

The “representative agent” is a fundamental concept of the theory of demand that derives from the philosophical notion of human beings as rational agents.     Such a notion corresponds to a generalization made about the rationality and purposive behavior of any given human agent. The two guiding-principles characterizing the putative agent are 1) the optimization principle: such that for subject S given an income m, S will always choose the bundle of goods (x_1, x₂) at prices (P₁, P₂ ) that  maximizes utility and 2) the equilibrium principle: such that prices (P₁, P₂ ) adjust until the amount (x_1, x₂) demanded equals the amount supplied[24] . It is this first principle that is so obviously non-scientific, and I will argue is ideological illusion that acts as functional ideology i.e. serves to limit the beliefs of the theory as a function of legitimation[25].

It is not scientific because such a generalization does not identify an historical mechanism, and makes no distinction between social forms. As a matter of fact, such an ahistorical generalization attempts to confuse the transience of social forms and historical mechanisms, and is meant to imitate some kind of natural law. It is all well and great to say that given an income, which is obviously not a necessary, nor inevitable, economic category, that humans are motivated by the desire to maximize utility. But that refers to absolutely nothing specific in history, and the only way to make it relevant across history is to be able to argue that there is an ahistorical standard of “utility” (which generally means reducing human motivation to hedonism[26] [27]). The best such a principle can do is show how people always act “for the good” or “for pleasure and to minimize pain” based on differing and contradictory concepts of “utility”, unless the concept is reduced to a “felicific calculus”. For instance, in an agricultural society with a low degree of productivity, can it be said that the product of labor is “income”, and that such a society has the same conception of “utility” as our own? Hence, the concept of a representative agent does not point to a socially-relative historical disposition and cannot explain social evolution insofar as it cannot comprehend the difference and uniqueness of each social form.

Yet, it the case that such a generalization legitimates the present social conditions and relations and has strong influence in shaping and forming the theory. The generalization confounds the specific contemporary case with a necessary property of all human societies. In other words, the generalization about rationality and utility-maximization only makes sense in the current form of society, in which the owner of capital is motivated to maximize profit. Hence, the anachronistic representation of social conditions and relations can only reinforce the belief that such a social form is legitimate, since it has and always will be as such.

This characteristic dependence on ahistorical generalization, in which no genuine historical mechanism is identified, and in which the confusion of current for necessary conditions means that economic theory cannot fulfill the dual-criterion of objectivity. Hence, it will show continuous deficits in being able to intervene in the course of events to produce an expected outcome. The lack of objectivity, in conjunction with the ideological pressure exerted on the theory, account for recent events. For instance, the inability to understand the specific and persistent capitalist tendency of profit-maximization, and the consequent tendency of the rate of profit to fall in competition, has meant that economic theory is not able to theorize the general causes of capitalist crisis, and hence has been unable to counter-act the recession and it’s legacy. The misrepresentation of human rationality precludes knowledge of the socially-relative and central role of profit-maximization and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as significant reasons for such cyclical booms and crises, since according to most neo-classical economics the two principles above imply a continuous or nearly permanent equilibrium in which for the price-theory the tendency of equalization is already presupposed in what is known as “normal profit” (the opportunity cost which is the hypothetical profit to which a capitalist is entitled in a situation in which the rate of profit is presupposed equal across sectors). Hence, the theory excludes efforts consecrated to either eliminating the tendency altogether or else boosting corporate profit. For theoretical and political reasons, various economic agencies have utilized a program of quantitative easing which constitutes minimal fiscal intervention (QE). These programs have not counter-acted the weakness of the profit-rate, and the impact of QE on growth has been close to 0. Hence certain “hard” economic indicators like investment and growth have not recovered to pre-recession rates.

As the neo-classical theory of demand includes and is based on a fundamental concept which is not historically specific, and is ideological in the broad sense of misrepresenting and legitimating the social conditions and relations to be natural fiats, it is a paradigm case of pseudo-science. Hence, such a theory will abhor any competing theory which takes up the inherent inconstancy of social forms, and will tend to eliminate historical considerations altogether from the domain of its consideration. Today, there is no field whose theory, agenda and methods are as ahistorical and affected by ideology, as neo-classical economics.

Notes

[1] In society today, what is considered science gains a certain priority and the means of research. What is considered science depends very much on the state of the economy and politics. A very good case of this is shown in the work “Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union” by Martin A. Miller. Miller shows how changes in the leadership of the Russian Communist Party and state of the USSR affect the place of psychoanalysis in Russia. In the beginning of the construction of the Soviet State, the Communist Party at large expresses ambivalent positions concerning psychoanalysis. However, some of the leadership believes it to be a scientific enterprise of great practical import. Hence, for a period in the early twenties psychoanalysis has enough support from the state to exist in the academia and make certain practical gains e.g. in 1921 a psychoanalyst by the name of Vera Schmitt opened up the Detski Dom Laboratory, a school based on the principles of psychoanalysis. Yet, by the late 1920’s the Stalinist wing of the party armed with a crude naturalist criterion of science had won out, and such adventures were soon forbidden. Psychoanalysis was subjected to a witch-hunt and expelled from academia.

[2] The notion of an empirical basis often has to do with verificationism i.e. that a statement is meaningful iff it is either analytic or synthetic. Verificationism itself depends on the presupposition that either statement can be confirmed or disconfirmed by indirect or direct observation. The first account is confirmative, the second falsificationist. Hence, an empirical basis is simply that set of observational-statements that confirm or disconfirm a theory. For an account of confirmative verificationism, the work “The Structure of Scientific Theories” has a critical introduction by Frederick Suppe, which has informed my formulation. It is the best explication of the positivist account of science and the naïve and confirmative verificationism (Suppe, 3-118). For an account of falsificationism, consult the essay “Falsification and The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” by Emre Lakatos.

[3] I define the “stronger than” relation in the following terms: a theory T is stronger than theory Y only if the T-statements of both theories range over the same extension as the O- statements, but in which Y is a proper sub-set of T. Hence, the history of science can be represented as an ordered series of theories based on the “stronger than” relation. Such an idea might have a certain appeal. After, all it might seem implausible that science cannot be judged based on the comprehensiveness of its explanations. It would seem that empirical strength should be a necessary quality in judging one theory over another to be scientific and the history of science has exhibited the replacement of theories by more comprehensive and unified theories that gain in increasing precision of explanation and prediction. Yet, such a statement about science conflates the empirical strength of a novel and mature theory, or what Kuhn calls “normal science”. Copernicus’s theory was at first weaker with relation to the existing astronomical data than the contending Ptolemaic theory. If such a conservative-criterion of the necessity of empirical strength is universally upheld as a sort of ideal of scientific practice, then can it not be argued that in the beginning phase of the helio-centric theory it was justified for the astronomers of that era to reject the helio-centric theory as not scientific?

[4] Notably in the early work of Marx including “Critique of the Philosophy of Right”, “The German Ideology”, “The Holy Family”.

[5] In the work “Karl Marx: Arguments of the Philosophers”, Allen Wood disambiguates the term “ideology” in the work of Marx. He disambiguates three meanings, but I have adopted only two because the third “historical idealism” is not relevant for my purposes, and refers to the belief, or anything presupposing such a belief, that ideas are the cause of social phenomenon and historical change. This does not exclude that historical idealism can be related to the other two meanings and in fact Wood does an excellent job of showing how they often interact to contribute to the most basic function of ideology, which is the legitimation of social conditions and relations (Wood, 118-121).

[6] Such a treatment of historical materialist explanation is provisional. There is a debate on the kinds of explanation applied to history. There is an attempt to argue that history presupposes one or another kind of explanation i.e. either genetic or teleological. Both kinds of explanation are applied to inanimate as animate systems. A teleological explanation explains the existence of something with reference to its function (or dysfunction) within a system. Often, the system involved is thought to exhibit certain tendencies that contribute to either a condition of persistence or an equilibrium state. The necessity attributed to such explanation is grounded on the argument that such a function (or dysfunction) makes an essential contribution to the condition of persistence or equilibrium state. Genetic explanation explains the existence of a system with reference to past systems and features. The explanation seeks to set out the series of events through which a previous system is transformed into a future system. The necessity attributed to the events included will be determined by a given criterion of causal relevance to the transformation of the system. Yet, in reality historical materialism presupposes both a problem of historical structure and transformation. Hence, its explanation would not presuppose a disjunction of teleological and historical explanation. In fact, historical materialism first specifies the sort of system under consideration. The system is a social structure that exhibits certain persistent tendencies that account for its existence and transformation, not simply a continuum of historical events. Teleological explanation is then used to explain the function of something for a given social structure by the relation it shares in contributing to (or detracting from) persistent tendencies. Genetic explanation is then used to explain the transformation of one social structure with reference to the previous social structure and its persistent tendencies. It is possible for the tendency of social structure to be an essential condition of persistence at one moment, and a condition of destruction at another given the overall transformation of a social structure. For instance, the social structure of Russian capitalism and the Tsarist state in the turn of the 20^th century meant that a previously agrarian population was being slowly but surely proletarianized. The proletarianization of labor promoted the efforts of Russian industrialists, financiers, to develop Russian capitalism. Russian capitalism was always backed by the Tsarist state, with its credit-connection to French banks such as Credit Immobilier. Needless to say with the onset of World War I this same industrial work-force was the most vigorous opponent of the Tsarist state. At one moment proletarianization is a tendency that contributes to Russian capitalism and state, and at another it is a condition of destruction of the state and of capitalist power.

[7] Both Peter Railton and Allen Wood agree that the term ideology is part of a materialist explanation of ideas, in the sense that the term explains the existence and pervasion of an idea by imputing to it a “legitimating-function”. In the “German Ideology” Marx says: “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”, which are “nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships”(Marx, 64). In “Marx and the Objectivity of Science”, Railton considers that “what is meant by ideal expression is revealed when he argues the ruling ideas have a legitimating-function: a ruling class must “represent its interests as the common interest ..[give] it’s ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones”” (Marx, 65-66) (Railton, 813). I owe both the description of materialist explanation, and the distinction between different meanings of the term “ideology” to the work “Karl Marx: Arguments of the Philosophers” by Wood.

[8] “Engels even asserts flatly that in order to be ideology, a belief or form of consciousness must be unaccompanied by any awareness of its own [social] basis… We normally apply the term “illusion” only to positive errors, not merely for gaps of ignorance, even self-ignorance… But Marx obviously thinks that this ideological self-ignorance is often supportive of many “illusions” in a more straightforward sense. As long as they are ignorant of the fact that their beliefs are socially prevalent on account of the social function that beliefs fulfill , people are likely to think that these beliefs are so widespread because they are justified. “ (Wood, 120-121).

[9] Of course it would be possible to make such a normative statement like “the law of gravity unfair”. It would be difficult to come up with grounds for a normative statement about something that cannot be changed by any kind of human action, in contexts in which such a statement would have sense, it is generally the relation of gravity to some human situation which accounts for its unfairness. At the minimum thought, it would be difficult to make a normative statement proscribing some kind of rectifying action. Hence, it would be equally moot to make a normative and proscriptive statement against a hypothetically immutable feature of society if it is impossible to change by human action.

[10] I have been speaking of “system of ideas” and “ideas” and see no problem of “substituting” theory.     I perform the substitution since my ultimate concern is to apply my analysis of ideology to theory and the items of theory e.g. concepts, propositions etc.. I suppose the major problem with such a move is a system of ideas or an idea is not the same kind of thing as a theory, for a theory is true or false independent of human consciousness , which does not necessarily seem to be the case for system of ideas or an idea.

[11] For instance in GA Cohen’s work “Karl Marx’s Theory of History” he argues that in the work of Marx “it is a defining property of ideology that it is unscientific (Cohen, 46).

[12] In the introduction to “Foundations of Arithmetic” by Gottlieb Frege, Frege argues against all pyschologism in defining the foundations of mathematics. He contends that a mathematical concept of number is not a statement about things, nor is it a statement about the human thinking process. It is neither “material nor ideal” and is objective in the sense of being mind-independent. Hence, to try to define number by means of describing it as a psychological process does nothing to ground knowledge. It is here that I read the distinction between the conditions of existence and knowledge in which a condition of existence is neither necessary nor sufficient to ground or justify knowledge, but may nonetheless explain its existence and pervasion by allusion to its social function.

[13] I can think of a case for the first possibility. There is a certain engineering technique that is discovered. Only the ruling-class however has the means of using it and implements it to build private condominiums which increases their wealth. This is not so different from the way capital uses scientific advancements today, as theoretical knowledge can only be operationalized by those with the resources (vaccines, immunological therapies etc. are extremely expensive to produce even if the majority of the knowledge needed to produce such commodities was government-sponsored). A case for the second possibility is Darwin. Exegesis of Darwin’s work reveals influences from Malthus, and the Malthussian- Hobbseian notion of a competition for survival applied to the biological process of evolution. Hence, no matter how scientific Darwinian evolutionary theory is, it is also influenced by a belief about society that promotes ignorance of the social basis and naturalizes historical conflicts. See Panekoek “Marxism and Darwinism” for a demonstration of the Malthusian influences on Darwinism : https://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/1912/marxism darwinism.htm

[14] Railton, 815

[15] Hume further reduces such a cognitive relation to a synthesis of perceptions of similar or dissimilar qualities by the imaginative faculty. Such a notion of causation is a function of a wider positivist ontological position which is still strong in robust ways. For instance, David Lewis accepts that reality, at least @ is a “ vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another” (Lewis, 1986b, ix). I see only minute difference between such a statement and the Humean notion of reality, for both take sensations as fundamental to ontology.

[16] I fear my talk of mechanisms, dispositional properties, in short causation, will be the weakest aspect of the paper. I wish I could say more on the aporias which inflict a regularity account. Bhaskar “A Realist Theory of Science” and “Chakravarty “Causal Realism: Events and Processes” provides arguments against such an empirical account of causation. These two papers give different strategies for showing the aporia. With Bhaskar, the argument is fundamentally that such a notion of cause-effect which considers the range of the relation to be exhausted by sensations is fundamentally subjectivist and anthropomorphic. It also lands itself in its own traps, in a sort of intellectual conundrum of its own making. If causation is such a relation gleaned off the text of reality, then in order for it to have “necessity” and be more than a mere accidental connection, then the relation between event A and event B must always be instantiated and perceived, or instantiated and perceived relative to the probabilities ascribed to each event. If that is the case, then there has simply never been a causal-connection. The conclusion is skepticism of causal-talk as of talk of science discovering causal mechanisms. Against such an account Bhaskar counterposes an account of science, and then interprets a causal-connection to be the result of scientific practice, the discovery of a causal mechanism through experimentation, which allows for the control and production of phenomenal regularities. Necessity means nothing less than the fact that as a result of scientific practice we know a causal connection endures as a real power between things, hence as a possibility which need not be instantiated or perceived. A hypothetical mechanism need not be perceived for it to be admitted as plausible, for in the history of science mechanisms which are unperceivable one day, becomes manifest, or ostensive in effect, at a future date. A hypothetical mechanism need not be instantiated for it to be considered an enduring connection, because the mechanisms discovered by science do not operate in isolation, but can be affected by counter-acting powers and tendencies. Chakravarty takes another direction and makes an argument that the issue of such a notion of causation is that it is impossible to come up with a criterion of discreteness for events, so that in the continuum of a process G , it is impossible to demarcate for some time-duration (T_i –T_x) a discrete event A called “cause” , and for some later time-duration a discrete event B called “effect” for G. There are fundamental ambiguities in such an account that call for greater elucidation before they are presupposed without argument. Necessity here seems to be an intensional-relation between the properties of individuals.

[17] Bhaskar gives a materialist interpretation to the term “tendency” which has been useful in devising my own preliminary account of “disposition” (Bhaskar, 163-169). Essentially, the account the process of science is hypothesis and experimentation, in which the result is to explain the complex and structured phenomenon of our world in terms of different levels of powers and tendencies inhering in things. Hence, a causal connection between things is inassimilable to the empirical connection of actual phenomenal regularities. What this means is for some object x which exhibits some “fundamental” property e.g. physical, chemical, biological etc. where x can presuppose a finite list or total list of fundamental properties, x is to be explained by distinguishing and interrelating different kinds of powers attributable to x at different levels. To understand the chemical aspect of the object called 2 NaCl + Hu2 , an explanation could be to understand the process of reaction that produces these molecules. 2HCl + 2 Na → 2 NaCl + Hu2 represents a chemical process and enduring reaction-relation, a chemical process which itself presupposes physical processes. Hence an explanation would not simply explain the chemical object by the reaction-relation inhering in between the elements but also by relating and grounding such an account to the 1) a theory of atomic number and valencey 2) a theory of electrons and atomic structure and 3) some competing account of sub-atomic processes (Bhaskar, 163-169).

 

[18] When I use “historical” I mean all “social” knowledge, all of the knowledge specifically produced about human society including but not limited to “economics, sociology, political science, history” etc. I consider the social sciences to be historical in the sense that they are attempting to discover the interaction of different kinds of mechanisms on the course of events and of human action, and above all focuses on the contribution of a kind of social mechanism to the evolution of a society.

[19] It might not be obvious that the historian produces knowledge to affect some outcome. Yet, though the connection might not be relevant for the historian, historical knowledge is used to affect the course of social evolution. The connection in general between the theoretician’s theory and the layman’s theory is hidden by the fact that in our kind of society those theories are distinguished in the division of production, so that it is not entirely evident based on a prima facie criterion of observation that the scientist, or historian actively engage in attempting to produce expected outcomes outside of the laboratory or academic space. But sometimes it is quite evident that theory is instrumental to producing certain outcomes. Take the example an economist like Bernanke, who is a prominent historian of the great-depression, and has used his knowledge of the causes and mechanisms of recession to guide his policy on monetary policy at the FED.

[20] Given there is great ambiguity in the phrase “historical features exist as a function of consciousness”. This statement could imply that a historical feature could exist independently of the consciousness of an individual. Hence, what is meant here is something like “historical features exist as a function of social consciousness”. But then how do you describe “social “ consciousness? Is it simply the sum of the ideation of individuals? Could you conceive of eliminating the awareness of individuals and still have a social reality? If this is taken to mean that there are no human beings then to demarcate material from historical features is just to presuppose that material things only exist in a world without humans. The issue is there is a confusion of social reality, with a crude notion of social consciousness. It seems to me that people can be unaware of a social reality or feature, that nonetheless regulates their lives, and which owes its existence just as much on the relational activity between humans, as on the sum and interrelation of individual thinking-processes. This relational-activity e.g. production is in part responsible for explaining the specific world of objects humans inhabit (Searle, 1-31).

[21] Let us say that the social organization of a social form is a structure of differing levels (economic, political, ideological) that are combined and interrelated in the course of historical development.     Each level is constituted by a kind of relation inhering between people, and is a system of such relations. Such a system exhibits persistent-tendencies and makes possible – as well as limits – human action and exhibits persistent-tendencies. For instance, feudalism is an economic structure based on the relation of serf to liege. Such a system presupposes a low-development of the means of production and severely limits the possible actions of both classes and individuals. Eric Hobsbawn has shown that for the average English peasants, as with Kant, that people did not move much more than a 20 km radius from their place of birth. Such a system lacks the impetus to develop the means of production, and technological and practical possibilities. For, the relation of serf to liege is one in which the latter has dominion by force and land. Hence, there is no mechanism like capital accumulation that has the net effect of continuously and systematically revolutionizing the means of production to further competition and profit-rates.

[22] “An abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and in so far as man has not interfered with them”. Marx realizes the specific transience and relativity of historical mechanisms and dispositions For him, the denial by economists of such transient and relative mechanisms, the fetishism of universal laws of social behavior and historical evolution, is to engage not simply in ideological talk, but in logical fallacies altogether. For the consequence of the use of universal laws in economics is to premise e.g. that production in general must exist, the issue that they take the specific mechanisms and dispositions of the present age as the general concept, and hence go from banal statements like “there must be production” to a specific inference of the form “there must be a specific form of production. The favorite inference of neo-classical economists is to from such a general statement about e.g. property to conclude that private property must exist. This is either a banality or a logical fallacy. Either we equivocate the meaning of property in general to mean the specific form of private property, in which case we are really only making the inference from “private property must exist” to “private property must exist”. Or else, you take the meaning of property in general to exclude the specific forms of property, in which case it is an invalid inference from the general existence of property to the existence of a specific form.

 

[23] “The subject matter of economics is essentially a unique process in history” (Schumpeter, 12).

[24] Any mainstream introductory economics course will presuppose these fundamental principles, though the formulation may change. I have adapted the specific formulation from Varian’s “Intermediate Microeconomics” (Varian, 3-22).

[25] Varian tries to say that such a statement is “almost” a tautology. It can be argued such a generalization about human-behavior is ideological illusion. The notion of the human being as a rational agent has varied across time and space, as the character of rationality has changed based on the ends proscribed by natural and social factors. Yet, to say that rationality has always been about utility-maximization is either to state something banal, or to make a controversial move.                   The controversial move is to reduce human rationality and purposive behavior to being directed towards biological pleasure, and disinclined from biological pain. The goal is to posses an ahistorical standard of utility to which all rational agents are directed. Yet, such an abstract principle falls into terrible aporias faced with the actual content of history. It is the case that the criterion of utility differs based on the form of society, and it would be possible to generate countless examples where one societies pain is another societies pleasure. Hence, often times the neo-classical and mainstream economist is a utilitarian in ethics.

[26] I have spoken of the principle of “utility”-maximization above in connection with utilitarianism. The best example of someone trying to reduce all utility to biological sensation is Benthem.                 In fact, Benthem presents us with the most extreme reduction of utility in the “felicific calculus”.             The felicific calculus is an algorithm which given an action computes the quantity of utility or pleasure on the basis of a set of variables. The number of logical and philosophical issues such a theory of utility presents are too great to list here. But the most striking issue to me is the reduction of subjective qualities to objective quantities. Each variable e.g. “intensity” , “duration” is applied to “pleasure”, so that the utilitarian and hedonistic conception of motivation is already presupposed.

[27] Furthermore Anwar Shaik has shown that the concept of a “representative” agent -what he calls “hyper-rationality”- is actually completely superfluous for the theory. All the results of micro and macro economics can be accomplished without this unrealistic conception of human rationality and behavior. The motivation to guard and establish a theory on such an extreme concept therefore cannot owe itself to purely “technical issues” of deriving “successful” or “empirical” results.

 

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